Introduction
American philosopher John Rawls once wrote: "In constant pursuit of money to finance campaigns, the political system is simply unable to function" (Rawls 1999, 140) . Despite Rawls's assertion, money is a fundamental reality of US campaigns and elections. Recent decisions by the US Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC) (2010) and Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC (2007) to overturn campaign finance laws have reduced the barriers designed to keep a flood of money from entering into elections. They have also upset specific provisions or bans on soft money spending established by earlier laws such as the Tillman Act of 1907, 1 the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 2 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002.
3 As a result, increasing amounts of money are being contributed to and spent on the political process.
In the 2012 election, over $1 billion was raised and spent by candidates and groups in federal races (Open Secrets 2012b).
From anonymous groups to highly visible political parties, from PACs that focused on protecting material interests to not-for-profit groups supporting political causes, much of this money was donated to back individual candidates advocating policy issues important to group membership, or at the very least to key donors. Nevertheless, a large proportion of money came from individual donors for their own, often unknown, reasons. They comprised the largest source of funds for presidential candidates (Malbin 2006) .
Given the importance of money in the American electoral process, candidates spend increasing amounts of time courting donors (Doherty 2012). Very few contributions received by electoral candidates are spontaneous; in fact, most of the contributions raised by the candidates and their fundraisers are solicited (Mutz 1995; Francia et al. 2003 ). As we discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, this relationship between individual solicitation and contribution becomes magnified by the fact that presidential candidates focus time and resources on geographic areas where aspirants in previous races have had greater financial success (Sebold et al. 2012) . They would rather fish where previous anglers have had success rather than venture into uncharted waters.
The repercussions of this trend are troubling since not all parts of the country have identical interests. Hacker and Pierson (2010) believe that even when representatives are responsive to policy needs of the less affluent, the affluent have the ability to force "policy drift." In other words, the affluent can maintain their wealth because they have the resources to capture elected officials who need their money to compete in a costly electoral process. In fact, Taylor (2010) and Berry et al. (2010) find that presidents appear to direct distributive spending in their proposed budgets toward states in which they were electorally rewarded. It is no stretch to posit that they also reward states and regions in which they are financially
